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ABSTRACT
This article seeks to help business practitioners anticipate and prevent
business challenges related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. To this end, it
attempts a high-level, practitioner-friendly review of the FCPA—including an indepth look at the anti-bribery provisions, case-based illustrations of their
application, and guidelines for staying in compliance. Part I provides practitioners
with a brief introduction to the FCPA. Part II proceeds with a more detailed
background and overview of the FCPA, examining both the statute’s enactment
and the obligations arising from it. Part III provides practitioners with an overview
of significant global developments in anti-corruption policy, and profiles the
important FCPA trends that will dot the business landscape in the near future. Part
IV further examines the difference between activities proscribed by the FCPA and
those excepted. And finally, Part V discusses several implications for business
practitioners, including salient points and guidelines for compliance.
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You spent tens of thousands of dollars to secure a good education and, after a
multitude of interviews and internships, you landed the job. Your ingenuity,
dedication, sacrifice, and hard work paid dividends and led to increasing
responsibility and several promotions. It has taken half your life, but your work
now spans the globe and your company trusts your oversight of thousands of
people and many millions of dollars. Unbelievably, everything now hangs in the
balance . . .
On Monday, you learned that both you and your company are being
investigated by the United States Department of Justice. You recently oversaw the
acquisition of a company in India. The new business was ancillary to your current
concerns and the deal was small, so you relegated the fine details to a capable
subordinate and moved on. Now, there are allegations of a Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) violation, and talk of criminal penalties! You face the
possibility of arrest—losing everything you have worked so hard for. The
experience is surreal, and your entire life seems to have entered the twilight zone.
How could you have anticipated this? More importantly, how could you have
prevented it?
This article seeks to help business practitioners address both questions. To
this end, it attempts a high-level, practitioner-friendly review of the FCPA,
including an in-depth look at the anti-bribery provisions, case-based illustrations of
their application, and guidelines for staying in compliance. Part I provides
practitioners with a brief introduction to the FCPA. 1 Part II proceeds with a more
detailed background and overview of the FCPA, examining both the statute’s
enactment and the obligations arising from it. 2 Part III provides practitioners with
an overview of significant global developments in anti-corruption policy, and
profiles the important FCPA trends that will dot the business landscape in the near
future. 3 Part IV further examines the difference between activities proscribed by
the FCPA and those excepted. 4 And finally, Part V discusses several implications
for business practitioners, including salient points and guidelines for compliance. 5
I. INTRODUCTION—”BUSINESSPERSON, MEET THE FCPA!”
The FCPA is a Watergate-era law designed to prevent companies from
bribing foreign government officials and employees of foreign state-owned
companies for the purpose of gaining a business advantage. After several decades
of relative inactivity, the FCPA has now returned with a vengeance due in large
part to the economic collateral damage and contributing corporate corruption of the
most recent decade. 6 Accordingly, the United States federal government has been

* J.D., Pepperdine University, School of Law; M.B.A., Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of
Business and Management; B.A., Carthage College.
1
See infra notes 6–14 and accompanying text.
2
See infra notes 15–84 and accompanying text.
3
See infra notes 85–125 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 126–65 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 166–88 and accompanying text.
6
Dionne Searcey, Watergate-Era Law Revitalized in Pursuit of Corporate Corruption, WALL ST.
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cracking down and, after nineteen prosecutions in 2009 and another twelve in
2010, 7 it shows no sign of slowing down. In fact, FCPA enforcement is expected
to remain a prominent feature of the legal-regulatory landscape throughout the
duration of the coming decade, 8 with an intentional focus on individual FCPA
violators. 9 Notably, many other nations and international organizations have
followed the United States’ lead in establishing formal prohibitions against
business-related bribery of officials; some even more comprehensive and farreaching than the FCPA. 10 Consequently, it can now be said that there exists a
pronounced “international consensus against corruption” 11 and, stated
emphatically, “all companies, in all industries, doing business in all countries face
FCPA risk and exposure.” 12 Thus, the stakes have been raised for business
practitioners both foreign and domestic, and it is more important than ever for
individual decision-makers to understand the FCPA’s proscriptions and
exceptions.
Problematically, however, the FCPA’s wording is broad enough that
determining the difference between prohibited bribes and excepted facilitating
“grease” payments can be a challenge. What’s more, there also exists a decided
lack of judicial scrutiny and proliferating aggressive, but untested, enforcement
theories suggesting that almost everyone is somewhat fuzzy about the dividing line
between legitimate aggressive business conduct and bribery that violates the
FCPA. 13 As a result, many companies now employ consultants to help determine
whether expenditures, like dinners for foreign state officials or foreign business-

J., October 15, 2010, at B2.
7
Id.
8
Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of its Decade of
Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389 (2010).
9
Id. at 404 (citing The FCPA Blog, available at http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/12/31/2009fcpa-enforcement-index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2012)).
10
Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 287 (1999). See also H. Lowell Brown, Avoiding Bribery When Doing Business
Overseas, 20 ME. B.J. 78, 78 (2005) (“Although all nations prohibit the bribery of their own
government officials, for many years the United States was alone in prohibiting corrupt payments made
to officials of foreign governments. However, due largely to the efforts of the United States as well as
private organizations such as Transparency International, multinational conventions have been adopted
by the Organization of American States, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
the European Union, the Council of Europe, and most recently, the United Nations, directing their
signatories to adopt FCPA-like legislation governing the overseas actions of their own nationals and
others acting within their territories.”).
11
See Brown, supra note 10, at 78.
12
See Koehler, supra note 8, at 396 (indicating this to be the main loss from the increase in FCPA
enforcement over the course of the last decade). See also Brown, supra note 10, at 78 (“[A]nyone
doing business internationally now faces an increasingly complex and interlocking network of criminal
and civil laws whose aim is to eliminate transnational bribery, but whose effect may extend beyond
simply prohibiting corrupt foreign payments.”).
13
Koehler, supra note 8, at 409 (“[T]he fact remains that every corporate FCPA enforcement
action over the last two decades has been resolved without a trial and nearly every FCPA individual
enforcement action has also been resolved without a trial. If nothing else, the FCPA trials in 2009
demonstrate that when a FCPA enforcement action is challenged, the DOJ is not infallible when
enforcing the FCPA, that its aggressive interpretations of the statute will not be universally accepted,
and that even judges remain fuzzy as to the dividing line between aggressive business conduct and
conduct that violates the FCPA.”).
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related golf outings, will land them in the center of federal enforcement agency
crosshairs. 14
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
A. Enactment of the FCPA
As described, the portion of the FCPA considered herein prohibits
companies from paying or offering to pay foreign government officials or
employees of foreign state-owned companies in order to gain a business advantage.
However, the FCPA also explicitly includes one exception and two affirmative
defenses that inoculate against penalties for otherwise actionable conduct. The
obfuscating gray area resulting from these provisions is a salient focus of this
paper. Nonetheless, a broader, contextualizing understanding of the FCPA is
necessary.
An amendment to the Securities Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934, the FCPA
was enacted in 1977 as “the result of an extensive Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) investigation and voluntary disclosure program during the
1970s in which it was discovered that U.S. companies were making millions of
dollars in bribes to foreign officials to secure business.” 15 Disclosures also
revealed that many of America’s largest public companies maintained “off-shore
‘slush funds’” to finance illegal campaign contributions in the United States. 16
Consequently, Congress enacted the FCPA in order to restore public confidence in
the business community, combat bribery of foreign officials, and require public
companies to demonstrate adherence by complying with certain bookkeeping
requirements. 17 Congress amended the FCPA in both 1988 18 and 1998, 19 adding
the aforementioned affirmative defenses and extending the statute’s reach to
include foreign entities and persons in an attempt to encourage international anticorruption efforts, and to foster a level business playing field for U.S. companies
doing business abroad. 20

14

See Searcey, supra note 6, at B2.
Rollo C. Baker, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647, 648 (2010) (citing S.
REP. NO. 95-114, at 3–4 (1977), H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4–5 (1977); SEC REPORT OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND
PRACTICES (May 12, 1976)). Baker notes that approximately 400 U.S. corporations admitted to making
such payments, totaling over $300 million. Id.
16
Brown, supra note 10, at 78 (quoting Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Priorities in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong. (1976)).
17
Baker, supra note 15, at 648.
18
See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, GOING PUBLIC HANDBOOK § 15:49 (2d ed.
2009) (for a succinct discussion of the 1988 amendment’s modifications to the FCPA).
19
See Donald Zarin, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Coping with Heightened Enforcement
Risks, 1619 PLI/Corp 11 (2007) (for intermittent discussion on the 1998 amendment’s modifications to
the FCPA).
20
Baker, supra note 15, at 648 (citing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, §§ 5001–03, 102 Stat. 1415, 1424 (1988); International Anti-bribery and Fair Competition
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, §§ 1–6, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998)).
15
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B. Obligations Arising Under the FCPA
For analytical purposes, there are two key categories of obligations
established by the FCPA: 21 1) accounting provisions, of which this paper will offer
only a cursory review; and 2) anti-bribery provisions, which will be dissected and
discussed at length. In terms of accounting obligations, the FCPA amended SEA
provisions by adding record-keeping and internal control requirements for
companies issuing stock (issuers). These requirements apply to both a firm itself
and all the subsidiaries and affiliates under its control. 22 The FCPA requires these
companies to: 1) “make and keep books, records and accounts, which in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and disposition of the assets of
the issues”; 23 and 2) create and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
adequate to provide “reasonable assurances that, among other things, transactions
are recorded as necessary to maintain accountability for assets.” 24 Notably, as is
also the case for the anti-bribery obligations, violation of these accounting
obligations can lead to both civil enforcement actions by the SEC, and even
criminal prosecution by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) where an
individual knowingly circumvents (or fails to implement) a system for internal
accounting controls, or falsifies any book, record, or account. 25
The anti-bribery obligation promulgated by the FCPA is extremely
comprehensive, and:
[G]enerally prohibits U.S. companies (whether public or private) and their
personnel; U.S. citizens; foreign companies with shares listed on a U.S. stock
exchange or otherwise required to file reports with the SEC; or any person while in
U.S. territory from: (i) corruptly paying, offering to pay, promising to pay, or
authorizing the payment of money, a gift, or anything of value; (ii) to a foreign
official; (iii) in order to obtain or retain business. 26

As demonstrated, the FCPA is not simple—each subsection has multiple
parts and remains broadly defined—so the first challenge for the business
practitioner is to understand the statute elementally, and then grasp the meaning
and significance of each element. The elements of the FCPA’s anti-bribery
obligation are as follows:
1) An issuer, domestic concern or any other person while in the territory of the
United States; 27 2) makes use of the mails or any other means or instrumentality of

21
Cherie O. Taylor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Primer, 17 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE
L.J. 3, 4 (2008) (noting that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 is codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78 dd-1, 78 dd-2, 78 dd-3, 78 ff (West 1997 & Supp. 2008)).
22
Id.
23
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (West 2011)).
24
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2011)).
25
Taylor, supra note 21, at 4 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(5) (West 2011) and noting that criminal
liability is not imposed for technical or insignificant accounting errors).
26
Koehler, supra note 8, at 389–90 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (2006)).
27
Taylor, supra note 21, at 4 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2 (West 1998) for domestic concerns, §
78dd-3 for persons other than issuers or domestic concerns, and noting that the prohibitions listed
“include the officers, directors, employees, agents or shareholders action on behalf of the issuer,
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interstate commerce, 28 3) corruptly, 29 4) to offer, pay, promise to pay, or authorize
the payment of money or anything of value; 30 5) to any foreign official, political
party or candidate for political office or any other person while knowing that some
payment will be passed to such parties; 31 6) to influence any act or decision,
inducing unlawful action or inducing action to influence any act of a government or
instrumentality to secure any improper advantage; 32 and 7) to obtain, retain, or
direct business to any person. 33

The first element establishes the ubiquitous panoply of constituents covered
by the statute’s prohibitions. First, the FCPA applies to “Issuers,” meaning
generally companies with publicly traded stock on any U.S. stock exchange. 34
Next, the FCPA applies broadly to “Domestic Concerns.” 35 This includes any
individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States, and any
business entity (i.e., corporation, partnership, association, joint stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship) that has its
principle place of business in the United States, or is organized under the laws of a

domestic concern or person”).
28
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77dd-2(a), 77dd-3(a) (West 1998)).
29
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77dd-2(a), 77dd-3(a) (West 1998), and noting that “corruptly” is not
explicitly defined in the statute but has been defined by the court in United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d
1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991)).
30
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 (West 1998) for issuers, 78dd-2 for domestic concerns, 78dd-3
for any person).
31
Id. See also Zarin, supra note 19, at 31. “The prohibition against ‘corrupt’ payments also
applies to payments made by third parties, where the corporation pays the third party knowing that the
payment will be passed on in whole or in part to a foreign official for a proscribed purpose.” Id. at 29
(citing S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 11 (1977)).
32
Taylor, supra note 21, at 4, 5 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1)(A)&(B), (2)(A)&(B),
(3)(A)&(B), 78dd-2(a)(1)(A)&(B), (2)(A)&(B), (3)(A)&(B) (West 1998)).
33
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 (West 1998) for issuers, 78dd-2 for domestic concerns, 78dd-3
for any person).
34
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006) (note that this section applies both the accounting and antibribery proscriptions to “Issuers”); see also Zarin, supra note 19, at 16–18 (noting that, according to the
Exchange Act, an issuer is defined as “any person who issues or proposes to issue any security . . . .”
15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(8) (2006)). Zarin expounds on the definition of “Issuers” with exacting detail,
indicating that issuers include the following:
Issuers with a class of securities registered on a national securities exchange
pursuant to section 12(b) of the Exchange Act; Issuers with a class of equity
securities listed on the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation (NASDAQ) System; Issuers that have $10 million or more in assets on
the last day of their most recent fiscal year and that have a class of equity
securities held by 500 or more persons, with the exception of issuers specifically
exempt under section 12 or the rules there under or that have received an
exemption from the SEC; Foreign private issuers whose securities are registered
under the Exchange Act”; “Banks and other financial institutions that file
Exchange Act reports with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
or other appropriate financial institution agency, also known as “section 12(i)
companies”; Issuers that offered securities to the public using the vehicle of a
registration statement and prospectus pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 – but
only during the on-year “duty to update” period following the offering (section
15(d) registrants).
Zarin, supra note 19, at 16–18.
35
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006) (note that this section applies only the anti-bribery proscriptions
to “Domestic Concerns”).
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state, territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States. 36 Finally, the
FCPA also applies to other persons, including United States persons 37 and foreign
persons. 38 Accordingly, several of the more notable emerging trends in FCPA
enforcement include the DOJ’s intentional focus on individual FCPA violators for
giving bribes, and bribe recipients for their part in receiving them. 39
The second element addresses the method of conveyance utilized in the
violating act. 40 “It requires that some means or instrumentality of ‘interstate
commerce’ be used to offer or make the improper payments,” and defines
“interstate commerce” to include “trade commerce, transportation, or
communication between states or a foreign country and any state or between any
state or any place on ship outside.” 41 Notably, this element can be satisfied by
almost any method of conveyance, to almost any location. Even a single “letter,
fax, cable, phone call, airline ticket, etc. . . . “ will suffice, if done “in furtherance
of the effort to make a prohibited payment.” 42 Again, the language employed is
extremely broad, allowing many otherwise innocuous actions to constitute a
violation so long as they can be construed to be “in furtherance of the effort,” as
noted above. 43
The third element addresses the kind of intent, or willfulness, necessary to
constitute an FCPA violation. While the FCPA itself does not explicitly define the
term “corruptly,” congressional reports make clear its proper connotation as “an
evil motive or purpose” 44 intended to induce a foreign official to misuse either his
position or power. 45 More specifically, the inducement must be intended to

36

Brown, supra note 10, at 83.
See 15 U.S.C. §78dd-3 (2006); see also Brown, supra note 10, at 83 (noting that the FCPA
“establishes individual liability for ‘any officer, director, employee or agent’ of an issuer or domestic
concern,” and that “[a]ny act done corruptly by a U.S. person outside the United States will be subject
to the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA”).
38
15 U.S.C. §78dd-3. See also Koehler, supra note 8, at 390 (noting that the FCPA is routinely
described as applicable only to U.S. companies and citizens; however, as written and enforced, the
FCPA can apply to both foreign companies and foreign citizens, as well). Koehler later explicitly states
as “widely held misperception” the notion that “foreign nationals are not subject to the FCPA.” Id. at
405.
39
Koehler, supra note 8, at 405 (including a November 2009 quote from Assistant Attorney
General Lanny Breuer indicating that the DOJ’s pursuit of individuals was “no accident” and a
“cornerstone” of the DOJ’s enforcement strategy).
40
Taylor, supra note 21, at 5.
41
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(h)(5) (West 1998) introductory language).
42
Lillian Blageff, Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
REPORTER 1–7 (2008).
43
See Zarin, supra note 19, at 26 (“The inclusion of the phrase ‘in furtherance of’ as part of this
jurisdictional standard was intended to make clear that for liability to attach, the use of interstate
commerce need only be in furtherance of making a prohibited payment. This clause significantly
broadened the jurisdictional scope of the FCPA, making it easier to meet this requirement. Under this
standard, the use of an interstate facility need only be ‘incident to an essential part of the scheme.’”
(citing United States v. Draiman, 784 F.2d 248, 251 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Lea, 618
F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1980))).
44
Brown, supra note 10, at 80 (quoting Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm. On Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 95th Cong. (1977)).
45
Taylor, supra note 21, at 5.
37
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procure wrongfully directed business, preferential legislation, or favorable
regulation. 46 Thus, the attempted bribe must be made knowingly, with an
understanding that payment is being given in exchange for some unlawful
government action. 47 As a consequence, mere negligence is insufficient to
constitute a violation of the FCPA; however, any willful attempt at bribery is
sufficient, and need not actually succeed or produce the desired result. 48 Thus, an
individual can be convicted of bribery under the FCPA even if the recipient of the
bribe had no intent of attending to the briber’s wishes, or lacked the power to do
so. 49
The fourth element addresses the form in which the bribe is made. The
FCPA is written expansively and prohibits payments, gifts, or the giving of
“anything of value,” 50 thereby covering both attempts to bribe 51 as well as actual
bribes of any type. 52 Again, the phrase “anything of value” is not explicitly
defined in either the FCPA or its legislative history; however, it is included in
other U.S. criminal statutes and is “broadly construed to encompass both tangible
and intangible benefits that an official subjectively believes to be of value.” 53
Consequently, it is not necessary for that which is given or promised as the bribe to
have any definite value; 54 rather, the value of the payment is evaluated solely from
the perspective of the intended recipient. 55 Tangible offerings that have been
found to be “of value” by the courts include: money, discounts, use of resources
(e.g., materials, facilities, and equipment), entertainment, expense-paid travel,
lodging, food, loans with favorable interest rates, insurance benefits, charitable
contributions, and college scholarships. 56 Similarly, intangible offerings that have

46

Baker, supra note 15, at 660.
Id. at 661. See also Brown, supra note 10, at 80. Brown elaborates on legislative history
indicating that the use of the term “corruptly” in the FCPA is consistent with its use in the domestic
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(b); therefore, related Supreme Court comments are applicable to the
FCPA. Id. Thus, “[b]ribery requires intent to influence an official act . . . there must be a quid pro quo
– a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 404 (1999)).
48
Zarin, supra note 19, at 29. See Brown, supra note 10, at 81. Interestingly, even if there is a
valid or lawful purpose for a given payment to a government official, such fact alone does not insulate
an individual in an otherwise unlawful transaction from criminal liability “if there is evidence from
which it can be found that ‘the unlawful purposes were of substance, not merely vague possibilities that
might attend an otherwise legitimate transaction.’” Id. (citing United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662,
663 (2d Cir. 1990)). The lawful purpose does not inoculate against the unlawful one.
49
Zarin, supra note 19, at 31.
50
Id. at 44 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a) (2006)).
51
Brown, supra note 10, at 79. “A corrupt payment does not have to actually be made to
constitute a violation of the FCPA.” Id.
52
Taylor, supra note 21, at 5.
53
Zarin, supra note 19, at 44.
54
Brown, supra note 10, at 80.
55
Taylor, supra note 21, at 5. Taylor further indicates that companies must be careful to consider
the context of a given situation when evaluating potential FCPA considerations. Id. For example: “If
an investment is being made, such as a joint venture ‘anything of value’ could be ‘a stock interest in a
joint venture company, a contractual right or interest, real estate, personal property, or other interests
arising from business relationships.’” Id. at n.59 (citing Lucinda A. Low & John E. Davis, The FCPA
in Investment Transactions, 1 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES REPORTER 5–6 (2008)).
56
Baker, supra note 15, at 658; Brown, supra note 10, at 80.
47
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been found to be “of value” by the courts include: information, sex, promises of
future employment, and witness testimony. 57 Once again, the FCPA’s language is
interpreted very broadly in order to affect the congressional purpose, as previously
discussed.
The fifth element elaborates on the identity of the intended recipient. The
FCPA “makes it clear that any bribe must go to a foreign government official,
political party or candidate.” 58 However, the FCPA does not address bribes paid to
employees of private, non-governmental entities, 59 or payments made directly to
governmental departments that are not for the personal use or benefit of any
specific foreign official. 60 Nonetheless, there is general agreement that the term
“foreign official” should be construed broadly, and includes persons working in
any branch of government, employees of state-owned enterprises, 61 and officials of
public international organization[s] 62 or persons working on the behalf of such an
organization. 63 Accordingly, once a foreign entity is considered to be an
“instrumentality” of a foreign government, all of that organization’s employees are
considered to be “foreign officials,” regardless of individual status or level of
responsibility. 64 In addition, the FCPA proscribes payments made directly to a
57

Zarin, supra note 19, at 45; Baker, supra note 15, at 658.
Taylor, supra note 21, at 5. The inclusion of “candidates” in the FCPA proscription is a
recognition that such persons may be influential in the award of government business. Id. However,
this proscription is not intended to include lawful campaign contributions made in the course of
legitimate lobbying or other normal representations to foreign government officials. Zarin, supra note
19, at 42.
59
Publisher’s Editorial Staff, Commercial Bribery, THE LAWYER’S BRIEF 27 (Thomson Reuters,
June 27, 2008) (“The FCPA makes a rather curious distinction between a foreign official and a private
person. It is illegal to bribe a ‘foreign official’ but, at least under the FCPA, it is not illegal to bribe a
private procurement agent of a private foreign company . . . . Although individual countries make have
domestic bribery laws prohibiting such conduct.”).
60
Zarin, supra note 19, at 31.
61
A given entity need not be wholly owned by a foreign government to be deemed an
“instrumentality” of a foreign government under the FCPA. Baker, supra note 15, at 660.
62
Id.; see also Zarin, supra note 19, at 42 (“The ‘public international organizations’ covered by the
FCPA are those organizations designated by Executive Order pursuant to the International
Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1998), or any other international organization
designated by the President by Executive Order. This includes such organizations as the Organization
of American States, the European Space Agency, the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices, and the
World Bank.”).
63
Baker, supra note 15, at 660; see also Zarin, supra note 19, at 32–33 (“Neither the FCPA nor its
legislative history contains any guidance on the scope of the terms ‘officer’ or ‘employee.’ There are
no cases under the FCPA that further define these terms. Nor is it clear whether the scope of these
terms should be determined with reference to foreign local law. The domestic bribery statute and the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), and the cases decided thereunder, offer the most instructive
guidance in delineating the scope of these terms under the FCPA. Based upon these statutes and cases,
an ‘officer’ of a foreign government would include individuals appointed by the head of state or by
heads of executive departments and individuals who hold positions authorized by statute. An
‘employee’ of a foreign government would include individuals whose day-to-day performance is
supervised by the governmental authority.”).
64
Baker, supra note 15, at 660. See also Koehler, supra note 8, at 391–92, 410. “The lack of
judicial scrutiny of FCPA enforcement actions is most troubling in connection with the enforcement
agencies’ aggressive interpretation of the key ‘foreign official’ element of an FCPA anti-bribery
violation.” Id. at 410.
There is no dispute that elected foreign government officials, other foreign heads
of state, and employees of foreign government agencies such as foreign
58
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“foreign official,” or facilitated via a third party (e.g., consultant, distributor, joint
venture partner, foreign subsidiary, affiliate, subcontractor, etc.), where the
initiating payer knows 65 that the payment will ultimately be used for some
Consequently, business practitioners must remain
prohibited purpose. 66
intentionally vigilant, and be cognizant that “almost all international transactions
pose FCPA compliance risks.” 67
The sixth element deals with inducement—or influencing a foreign official
to act. There are four different types of inducements that are prohibited by the
FCPA: Acting to 68 1) influence a foreign official’s act or decision in his official
capacity; 2) induce a foreign official to act, or not act, in violation of his lawful
duty; 69 3) induce a foreign official to influence or affect an act or decision of his

equivalents of the U.S. Treasury Department, U.S. State Department, etc., are
“foreign officials” under the FCPA. Improper payments to such “foreign
officials” to “obtain or retain business” are what Congress intended to prohibit by
passing the FCPA in 1977. But the majority of 2009 FCPA enforcement actions .
. . have absolutely nothing to do with such government officials. Rather, the
alleged “foreign officials” are often employees of alleged foreign state-owned or
state-controlled enterprises (“SOEs”). The enforcement agencies deem such
individuals (regardless of rank or title and regardless of how such individuals
may be classified under local foreign law) as “foreign officials” under the theory
that their employers . . . are an “instrumentality” of a foreign government.
Id. at 391–92.
[This] interpretation . . . has never been accepted by a court . . . [and is] no
different than the DOJ or SEC telling you that the person you play softball with
on Thursday nights is a U.S. “official” merely because he or she works for
General Motors . . . given that [GM is] owned or controlled by the U.S.
government.
Id. at 410.
65
See Zarin, supra note 19, at 51–55 (explaining that the FCPA’s knowledge standard does not
require actual knowledge).
66
Taylor, supra note 21, at 5 (“Congress incorporated the ‘knowing’ standard into the statute to
ensure that corporate officials would not attempt to engage in either conscious disregard or deliberate
ignorance of the conduct of third parties with whom they did business.”); see also, Zarin, supra note 19,
at 48–49 (“Foreign sales agents were responsible for many of the questionable foreign payments
disclosed during the 1970s. As a result, the FCPA included a provision delineating the circumstances
under which a U.S. company or its officers and employees would be held accountable for illicit
payments made indirectly through intermediary third parties. The U.S. domestic bribery statute does
not contain a special standard for illicit payments made through intermediary third parties . . . . In
contrast, the FCPA may hold a U.S. company directly responsible for the conduct of a third party . . . .
Interestingly, however, the foreign intermediary engaging in the illicit conduct may be outside the scope
of, and therefore not subject to, liability under the FCPA . . . . The third party payment provision
continues to create great uncertainty and confusion regarding potential liability under the FCPA . . . .
Frequently, a U.S. company not directly involved in an illicit payment discovers that a third party with
which it has a commercial relationship . . . has made an illicit payment with regard to a contract award
involving the sale of the U.S. company’s goods or services . . . . [I]t is infrequent that the U.S. company
would know for certain that the third party in fact made a prohibited payment. More frequently,
suspicions or concerns are raised when allegations or inconclusive information comes to its attention.
The allegations of wrongdoing are generally vehemently denied by the third party. The third party may
also have important contacts and ties with government officials, thereby making it difficult and
commercially damaging to disengage from the relationship. It is in this kind of commercial setting that
the potential liability of a U.S. company for actions of a third party is most murky, making the actions
required of the U.S. company unclear.”).
67
Taylor, supra note 21, at 5.
68
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (West 1998).
69
See Zarin, supra note 19, at 60 (indicating that this language was added as a part of the 1988
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government; or, 4) secure any improper advantage. 70 Examples of these
inducements include: payments made to a government official to influence the
award of a telecommunications contract; 71 payments made to a legislator to obtain
a report of restrictions on foreign ownership of telecommunications companies; 72
payments made to a chief procurement officer to influence the purchase of spare
parts by a foreign air force; 73 payments made to a close advisor of a foreign head
of state to influence the sale of crude oil; 74 and payments made to a government
official to amend or repeal a regulation requiring an environmental impact
assessment for genetically modified agricultural products. 75 Notably, as discussed
further below, the FCPA’s proscriptions address both the winning of new contracts
and official decisions affecting existing business as well. Thus, payments to
government officials to obtain favorable tax treatment, 76 or reduced customs
duties, 77 have also been held to constitute “corrupt” inducements prohibited under
the FCPA.
The seventh element addresses the reason for the bribe. The FCPA prohibits
payments made to obtain or retain business, or divert or direct a business
opportunity. 78 This “business-purpose” test is intended to limit the scope of the
FCPA’s proscriptions by requiring that the illicit payment be made specifically to
1) direct business to a particular person, 2) divert business from a particular
person, or 3) maintain an established business relationship. 79 However, in contrast
to the “foreign official” element discussed above, this element has been subject to
judicial scrutiny. 80 Accordingly, “[c]ourts have held that Congress intended the
FCPA to prohibit bribes beyond a narrow range of payments sufficient to obtain or
retain government contracts.” 81 Thus, the FCPA precludes payments to foreign
amendments to make the FCPA conform to the standard found in the domestic bribery statute).
70
Id. at 60–62 (indicating that this language was added as a part of the 1998 amendments to make
the FCPA conform to the OECD Convention).
71
United States v. Harris Corp., Cr. No. 90-0456 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
72
S.E.C. v. BellSouth Corp., Lit. Rel. No. 17310 (2002).
73
United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).
74
S.E.C. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 86-1904 (D.D.C. July 8, 1986).
75
S.E.C. v. Monsanto Co., Civ. Act. No. 1:05CV-00014 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2005), Lit. Rel. No. 19023
(2005).
76
In the Matter of Baker Hughes Inc., Release No. 34-44784 (2001); United States v. KPMG
Sidharta Sidharta Harsono, Lit. Rel. No. 17127 (2001); S.E.C. v. Triton Energy Corp., Civ. Act. No.
1:97CV00401 (RMU) (D.D.C. 1997), Lit. Rel. No. 15396 (1997).
77
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
78
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) (2006)
79
Zarin, supra note 19, at 62.
80
Koehler, supra note 8, at 392; see also, Taylor, supra note 21, at 6 (“This particular element of
the statute was recently subjected to a searching analysis by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In
United States v. Kay, the Fifth Circuit reviewed an attack made on the FCPA for vagueness. According
to the court, the meaning of ‘obtain or retain business’ in the FCPA was not vague even it if was
ambiguous.” (quoting United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432 (2007))).
81
Baker, supra note 15, at 661; see also, Zarin, supra note 19, at 64 (“In rendering its decision, the
[Kay] court found significant the fact that the Senate’s legislative proposal, from which the final
statutory language for the FCPA was drawn, prohibited the use of ‘payments that assist in obtaining or
retaining “business,” not just “government contracts.”‘ The court noted that Congress had the option of
choosing the narrower language, which appeared in an SEC report, but had elected not to do so.”
(quoting Kay, 359 F.3d at 738)).
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officials for a broad range of purposes, ostensibly including corrupt payments
related to carrying out existing business, as well 82—even where the payments are
not directly related to the underlying business transaction. 83 For example,
payments made to a “foreign official” to incentivize him to lower taxes or customs
duties applied to a particular company can provide that company with an unfair
cost advantage over its competitors, and thereby assist it in “obtaining” or
“retaining business.” 84 As a result, there exists yet another pitfall for wary
business practitioners to avoid.
III. OVERVIEW OF HISTORICAL ENFORCEMENT AND MODERN DEVELOPMENTS
All nations prohibit the bribery of their own government officials, 85 but for
many years the United States stood alone in prohibiting the bribery of “foreign
officials.” 86 Even still, while the FCPA was technically on the books, enforcement
was largely non-existent during its first two applicable decades. 87 Further, cases
that were brought generally represented only the most flagrant violations. 88 As a
result, for most of the statute’s history, business practitioners considered the FCPA
as only applying to large, multi-national corporations. 89

82

Baker, supra note 15, at 661.
Zarin, supra note 19, at 63.
84
Koehler, supra note 8, at 393 (“But the Kay court empathetically stated that not all such
payments to a ‘foreign official’ outside the context of directly securing a foreign government contract
violate the FCPA; it merely held that such payments could violate the FCPA. According to the court,
the key question of whether such payments constitute an FCPA violation depend (sic) on whether the
payments were intended to lower the company’s costs of doing business . . . enough to assist the
company in obtaining or retaining business . . . . The court then listed several hypothetical examples of
how a reduction in customs and tax liabilities could assist a company in obtaining or retaining business
in a foreign country. On the other hand, the court also recognized that ‘[t]here are bound to be
circumstances’ in which a customs or tax reduction merely increases the profitability of an existing
profitable company and presumably does not assist the payer in obtaining or retaining business. Thus,
contrary to popular misperception, Kay does not hold that all payments to a ‘foreign official’ for
avoiding customs duties or sales taxes in a foreign country fall within the FCPA’s scope. Rather, the
decision merely holds that Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments intended to
assist the payer, directly or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business and that payments to a ‘foreign
official’ to reduce customs and tax liabilities can, under appropriate circumstances, fall within the
statute.” (quoting Kay, 359 F.3d at 755–56, 59–60)).
85
Nichols, supra note 10, at 257. The author later elucidates that “bribery is illegal in every
country in the world and is thus chronically difficult to observe;” and, that while “bribery as a
phenomenon is as old as bureaucratic systems . . . the prevalence of large-scale transnational bribery is
a recent occurrence” constituted in part by the “supply of bribes by investors from industrialized
countries . . . .” Id. at 272–73.
86
Lucinda A. Low, Owen Bonheimer & Negar Katirai, Enforcement of the FCPA in the United
States: Trends and the Effects of International Standards, 1588 PLI/CORP. 63, 81 (2007) (“For almost
25 years, the FCPA stood alone as the sole statute worldwide that criminalized the bribery of foreign
public officials.”).
87
Koehler, supra note 8, at 389.
88
Commercial Bribery, supra note 59, at 28 (further indicating that most FCPA cases rarely reach
trial and are, instead, resolved by guilty pleas or pleas of no contest).
89
Koehler, supra note 8, at 396 (noting that the business community generally assumed resource
extraction companies doing business in emerging markets faced the greatest risk related to the FCPA).
83
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A. Modern Developments
The last decade, however, has witnessed drastic changes in the domestic 90
and international landscape with regard to corruption in the public and private
sectors—the attitude of both the developed and developing world has changed. 91
The United States is now actively coordinating its FCPA enforcement activities
with dozens of other countries; foreign governments are both assisting the United
States and pursuing their own independent prosecutions. A large variety of multilateral initiatives have resulted in major regional conventions on bribery,
corruption, and increased prosecution. 92 Briefly, the significant new conventions
and noteworthy components that business practitioners should be aware of are as
follows: the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (facilitates
international cooperation in gathering evidence, seizing assets, and enforcing
forfeiture actions); 93 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (fosters increased international cooperation in
the investigation and prosecution of transnational bribery, including standards for
addressing jurisdictional conflicts, and also lacks any exception for “facilitating”
payments); 94 Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on
Corruption (provides for the criminalization of both active and passive (i.e.,
receipt) domestic bribery in the private sector, includes explicit provisions
regarding corporate liability (criminal), 95 and extends jurisdiction to illicit actions
of members of international parliamentary assemblies, judges, and other officials
of international courts (civil)); 96 the Convention on the Fight Against Corruption
Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of
the European Union (EU) (prohibits bribery of public officials in the EU); 97 the
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (covers
bribery in the public and private sectors, protects whistleblowers, and provides a
framework for cross-border enforcement); 98 and, the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (establishes mandatory preventative measures and criminalized
obligations for both public and private sectors, provides private causes of action
for victims of corruption, includes extensive anti-money laundering measures, and
has a provision for cooperation in investigation, prosecution, and asset recovery). 99
90
Taylor, supra note 21, at 3 n.2 (“[W]hile it was already the world’s leading prosecutor of foreign
bribery offenses, ‘the [DOJ] brought more FCPA prosecutions in the last five years than in all of the
previous 26 years dating back to the passage of the FCPA in 1977.’” (citing Office of the Attorney
General, Dep’t of Justice, The Accomplishments of the U.S. Department of Justice 2001-2009, 37
(2009))).
91
Low, supra note 86, at 81; see also Koehler, supra note 8, at 416 (noting that enforcement of
anti-corruption laws has ramped up around the globe).
92
Taylor, supra note 21, at 3.
93
Low, supra note 86, at 81–85.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Baker, supra note 15, at 672.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 673.
99
Low, supra note 86, at 85–86. The UN Convention is “conceptually the most ambitious,” and
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Finally, the major international financial institutions are also actively
implementing policies and programs designed to mitigate bribery and
corruption. 100 These include the World Bank, International Development
Association, 101 World Trade Organization, and International Monetary Fund. 102
B. Noteworthy Trends
The increasing global focus, and the success of the world community’s
efforts at addressing bribery and corruption, have catalyzed the development of a
handful of notable domestic trends in FCPA enforcement. These trends are of
practical importance to business practitioners.
First, both federal enforcement agencies (i.e., the SEC and DOJ) are taking
increasingly aggressive action against FCPA violations. 103 In fact, today each
agency typically oversees more than seventy FCPA investigations at any given
time. 104 These historically high levels of enforcement are complimented by the
fact that each agency’s areas of enforcement are slightly different. As a result,
“many companies have faced parallel enforcement actions by both entities.” 105 In
addition, the FCPA’s reach continues to grow as both agencies have demonstrated
a broadened enforcement focus (e.g., including both charitable and political
contributions), and aggressive use of other statutory authorities (i.e., bringing
additional charges against alleged FCPA violators, including: money laundering,
wire fraud, tax evasion, false statements, racketeering, conspiracy, and anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws). 106 Consequently, “it is becoming increasingly
common for companies to be subjected to simultaneous or sequential
investigations by U.S. authorities,” and then, thanks to the aforementioned increase
in international focus, foreign authorities and other international institutions as
well. 107 Thus, the FCPA has become “a three-headed monster” 108 that is only

has already been ratified by more than eighty countries including several major emerging market
countries that are not a party to any other anticorruption treaty (i.e., China, Russia, and Indonesia). Id.
at 86.
100
Baker, supra note 15, at 672–73.
101
Low, supra note 86, at 89.
102
Baker, supra note 15, at 673.
103
Id. at 676; see also Koehler, supra note 8, at 416 (“[Assistant Attorney General] Breuer noted
that the FCPA-specific FBI squad ‘has been growing in size and in expertise over the past two years.’
He announced that the DOJ has ‘begun discussions with the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal
Investigation Division about partnering with [the DOJ] on FCPA cases’ as well as ‘pursuing strategic
partnerships with certain U.S. Attorney’s Offices throughout the United States where there are a
concentration of FCPA investigations.’ The SEC has also ramped up its FCPA resources . . . creating a
specialized FCPA unit.”
(quoting Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., The 22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (Nov. 17, 2009), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2009/11/11-1709aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf)).
104
Baker, supra note 15, at 676–77.
105
Low, supra note 86, at 91.
106
Id. at 67, 91, 104–11.
107
Id. at 111 (recognizing that firms are often subjected to “simultaneous or sequential
investigations by U.S. authorities and foreign authorities, as well as investigations by international
institutions”).
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expected to get bigger. 109 It is little surprise then, that most FCPA cases are settled
rather than litigated! 110
Second, FCPA violations are being punished with increased severity, 111 as
reflected by the assessment of significantly higher penalties and increasing
disgorgement of profits. 112 In addition, enforcement agencies are making use of a
broader array of enforcement tools. 113 These include agency discretion as to
whether to prosecute a parent corporation, individual subsidiary, employee, agent,
or a combination thereof. 114 Enforcement agencies are also using varied
prosecution agreements, consent decrees, pleas, compliance monitoring, and other
measures. 115 Again, this trend is expected to continue.
Third, the DOJ and SEC are each placing increasing emphasis on the
efficacy of organizational compliance programs. 116 Notably, “[d]ecisions as to
sentencing amounts, non-prosecution agreements, and investigation initiation are
made substantially with an eye towards the business’ compliance program.” 117
With this in mind, business practitioners should focus particular attention on
compliance issues related to foreign agency, as all of the 2009 FCPA enforcement
actions against companies included foreign agent conduct. 118
Fourth, recent years have seen a noteworthy increase in self-reporting. 119
108
Koehler, supra note 8, at 396 (“Because improper payments that violate the FCPA’s antibribery
provisions are also often disguised or inaccurately recorded on the company’s books and records, many
FCPA enforcement actions against Issuers include parallel DOJ and SEC enforcement actions for both
antibribery and books and records violations. Further, internal control violations are often also pursued
in connection with antibribery and books and records violations on the theory that effective internal
controls would have prevented the improper payments and improper recording of the payments. Thus,
as to Issuers, the FCPA is often a three-headed monster when improper payments are made.”).
109
Id. at 417 (recognizing that “such parallel or ‘tag-along’ enforcement actions in other
jurisdictions as to the same core conduct at issue in a U.S. FCPA prosecution is (sic) expected to
become a new norm in this decade”); see also Baker, supra note 15, at 678 (stating that, “[a]mong the
developments that are anticipated are widespread multi-jurisdictional anti-bribery efforts with
facilitated cross-border evidence gathering, asset seizures, speedy extradition, and increased scrutiny of
American firms abroad, often without constitutional safeguards”); see generally Shearman & Sterling
LLP, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, 3, 6–7 (2008), available at
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA_Trends.pdf.
110
Low, supra note 86, at 77; see also Taylor, supra note 21, at 8 (recognizing that the FCPA
currently triggers the largest proportion of pre-trial agreements with government enforcement officials);
Koehler, supra note 8, at 406–07 (“Business entities involved in FCPA enforcement actions have
historically shown zero interest in challenging the enforcement agencies’ aggressive prosecution
theories, holding the agencies to their burden of proof, and enduring the uncertainties of trial. In fact,
no business entity has publicly challenged either enforcement agency in an FCPA case in the last
twenty years. . . . Individuals involved in an FCPA enforcement action, faced with a loss of liberty, are
more inclined to challenge the enforcement agencies and the summer of 2009 was the most active trial
period in the history of the FCPA.”).
111
Baker, supra note 15, at 677.
112
Low, supra note 86, at 67, 92; see also Taylor, supra note 21, at 8.
113
Low, supra note 86, at 93.
114
Id.
115
Id. (noting that enforcement agencies are using non-prosecution agreements, deferred
prosecution agreements, and compliance monitoring with three-year mandates).
116
Baker, supra note 15, at 677.
117
Id.
118
Koehler, supra note 8, at 402.
119
Baker, supra note 15, at 677.
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Whether or not due to the ominous threat posed by increased enforcement activity,
“an increasing number of firms are making voluntary disclosures of FCPA
violations in order to limit the chances of and/or impact of FCPA prosecutions.” 120
To this end, “[t]he SEC and DOJ have announced the official policy of favorable
treatment for voluntary disclosure, often resulting in fines well below the
Guidelines.” 121 Nonetheless, voluntary disclosure is the subject of increasing
controversy, as the apparent benefits have not been conclusively quantified and are
still perceived to be uncertain. 122
Fifth and finally, the enforcement agencies have demonstrated an increased
willingness to bring FCPA enforcement actions against individuals, both foreign
and domestic. 123 This focus is intentional. 124 “The deterrent effect of an
individual losing his or her liberty is . . . more powerful than a corporation paying
a multi-million [dollar] fine with corporate money.” This trend is particularly
significant for business practitioners because the SEC has historically charged
business executives under indirect theories of liability, and 2009 saw a unique
expansion of this precedence. 125
IV. BRIBES, “GREASE PAYMENTS,” AND BUSINESS PRACTITIONERS
The FCPA includes one exception and two affirmative defenses against
otherwise actionable conduct. However, business practitioners should note that
these provisions are quite limited in their effect, as demonstrated by the examples
to follow.

120

Taylor, supra note 21, at 8.
Baker, supra note 15, at 677 (citing case documentation claiming fines averaging twenty
percent lower where firms self-report).
122
Low, supra note 86, at 92.
123
Baker, supra note 15, at 667; see also Low, supra note 86, at 99 (providing examples including
lawyers, accountants, and corporate executives); see also Koehler, supra note 8, at 405 (“Another
significant development from the 2009 enforcement year is a demonstrated commitment by the DOJ to
target ‘foreign official’ recipients of bribe payments. In a November 2009 speech at [a] global anticorruption conference, Attorney General Eric Holder urged nations to work together to ensure that
‘corrupt officials do not retain the illicit proceeds of their corruption’ and announced a ‘redoubled
commitment on behalf of the [DOJ] to recover’ funds obtained by foreign officials through bribery.
Because the FCPA only applies to bribe-payers and not bribe-takes, the FCPA is not a tool in DOJ’s
pursuit of ‘foreign officials.’ But other legal avenues are available . . . .” (quoting Eric Holder, Att’y
Gen., Opening Plenary of the VI Ministerial Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding
Integrity (Nov. 7, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-091107.
html)).
124
Koehler, supra note 8, at 404 (“Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer . . . underscored this
point when he said . . . ‘prosecution of individuals is a cornerstone of [DOJ’s] enforcement strategy,’
and that ‘the prospect of significant prison sentences for individuals should make clear to every
corporate executive, every board member, and every sales agent that we will seek to hold you
personally accountable for FCPA violations.’” (quoting Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., The
22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2009/11/11-17-09aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf)).
125
Id. at 415. The 2009 Nature’s Sunshine Products (NSP) prosecution was the “first time the SEC
has used a ‘control person’ theory of liability in an FCPA enforcement action.” Id. The SEC alleged
that two of NSP’s executives had “supervisory responsibilities” over senior management and corporate
policy, and thus the company’s violations were essentially their own. Id. The author notes that the
SEC’s language here should “induce a cold sweat in any executive.” Id. at 414–15.
121
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A. The “Grease” Payment Exception
The FCPA’s sole statutorily mandated exception permits gratuities for
government officials who perform “routine governmental actions.” 126 These
gratuities are also known as “facilitating” or “grease” payments 127 because they
can be used to “expedite or secure the performance” of certain governmental
actions, as noted. 128 An example of such a “grease” payment would be a small tip
given to a government worker in order to obtain faster service than otherwise
normally experienced. 129 However, although seemingly simple, this provision has
been the subject of controversy since the FCPA was first established. 130 Thus, a
good ‘rule of thumb’ for business practitioners is that a grease payment “is paid to
get a government employee to do what she should do, whereas a corrupt bribe is
paid to get a government employee to do what she should not do.” 131
Still, a more sophisticated understanding is helpful because the phrase
“routine governmental action” is actually defined very narrowly in the statute. 132
In fact, Congress has specified four types of actions as being “routine
governmental actions.” These include: 1) obtaining permits, licenses, or other
official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; 2)
processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; 3) obtaining police
protection, mail pickup and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with
contract performance or the transit of goods; and, 4) obtaining phone service, or
power or water supply, loading or unloading cargo, or protecting perishable
products or commodities from deterioration. 133 Congress also included a fifth
‘catch-all’ category for “other similar activities . . . ordinarily and commonly
performed by an official.” 134
While this explication ought to be helpful, a number of challenges remain.
First, “grease” payments cannot be for purposes that can be construed as
encouraging an official to award new business or continue old business. 135
Second, “grease” payments must only ‘facilitate’ actions that are purely

126

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b) (issuers), 78dd-2(b) (domestic concerns), 78dd-3(b) (any person)

(2006).
127
Thomas P. Knoten, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Practicable Considerations for U.S.
Corporations, 55 J. MO. B. 39, 39 (1999).
128
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b) (issuers), 78dd-2(b) (domestic concerns), 78dd-3(b) (any person)
(2006).
129
Knoten, supra note 127, at 39.
130
Brown, supra note 10, at 81.
131
Knoten, supra note 127, at 39. See also Nichols, supra note 10, at 271. Some scholars make
the distinction as between “according-to-rule benefits” and “against-the-rule benefits”—the first are
benefits that the bribe-giver should have received pursuant to the rules, and the bribe-taker takes action
that he or she should have taken anyway. Id. “Common examples include matters such as routine
government approvals or the provision of basic government services.” Id. Bribes paid to obtain these
benefits are “facilitating payments.” Id.
132
Taylor, supra note 21, at 6.
133
Brown, supra note 10, at 81; see also Low, supra note 86, at 76.
134
Low, supra note 86, at 76.
135
Baker, supra note 15, at 662.
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“ministerial,” or in other words, “non-discretionary.” 136 Third, there is no
statutorily proscribed maximum dollar amount, or set guideline for appropriate
“grease” payment size. 137 And fourth, the “grease” payment exception is not
mirrored in the domestic bribery laws of many foreign countries and institutions
and, thus, frequently raises conflict-of-law issues. 138 Suddenly, the confusion and
genesis of the enduring controversy becomes clear. 139
B. The Affirmative Defenses
The FCPA also provides two affirmative defenses, which remove liability for
payments that fall into either of two specific categories. 140 The first affirmative
defense relates to payments that are legal in the country in which they are made. 141
Because the statutory language requires that the payment-justifying laws be
written, “a firm or individual charged with a violation cannot simply point to
customary practice in the relevant country” to apply this defense. 142 Consequently,
this defense is rarely used, and probably only applies in very limited factual
situations. 143
The second affirmative defense provides leeway for “reasonable and bona
fide expenditures.” 144 It is much more frequently used in practice 145 and is

136
Id.; see also Taylor, supra note 21, at 6 (“The definition of the phrase negates the inclusion of
any conduct by a foreign official that hinges upon decision-making, i.e., the exercise of discretion.
Congress insisted upon this type of interpretation in the legislative history of the statute, noting that it
would not consider ‘ordinarily and commonly performed’ actions with regard to issuing permits or
licenses to include ‘those governmental approvals involving an exercise of discretion by a government
official where the actions are the functional equivalent of obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 921 (1988) (Conf. Rep.)).
137
Baker, supra note 15, at 662. The author continues by noting that all payments found to fall
within the “grease” payment exception have been less than $1000. Additionally, courts have yet to
interpret this exception, but commentators suggest that the correct focus is on the payer’s intent and
purpose of the payment, instead of the amount of the payment. See also Taylor, supra note 21, at 6.
“There is no set limit on the amount that can be paid as a facilitating payment. The crucial issue is not
really value but purpose.” Id.
138
Low, supra note 86, at 76. Low continues by noting that there is also no parallel exception on
the books and records side of the statute for such payments. Id.
139
See Koehler, supra note 8, at 394 (“Post-Kay there has been an explosion in FCPA enforcement
actions, including actions in 2009, where the alleged improper payments involve customs duties and tax
payments or are otherwise alleged to have assisted the payer in securing foreign government licenses,
permits, and certifications which assisted the payer in generally doing business in a foreign country.”).
140
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c) (issuers); 78dd-2(c) (domestic concerns); 78dd-3(c) (any person)
(2006).
141
Id.
142
Taylor, supra note 21, at 6 (“Congress noted clearly in the legislative history that the absence of
written laws ‘would not by itself be sufficient to satisfy this defense.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-576,
at 922 (1988) (Conf. Rep.)).
143
Low, supra note 86, at 77 (“The facts of most cases rarely support the application of the first
defense, especially if it is construed in accordance with its literal terms. Nevertheless, it may be applied
. . . to transactions or activities which are legally compelled by [a] host country’s written laws . . . for
example, the requirement that a parastatal entity participate in a project, or that the investor satisfy other
terms or conditions mandated by the government.”).
144
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c) (issuers); 78dd-2(c) (domestic concerns); 78dd-3(c) (any person)
(2006); see also Baker, supra note 15, at 663 (noting that “[t]he second affirmative defense
encompasses payments, gifts, offers, or promises of anything of value . . . .”).

2012

BRIBERY BOOM OR BUST

421

important for any business practitioner or organization active abroad. 146 In order
to qualify under this defense, payments must “relate directly to the promotion,
demonstration, or explanation of products or services, or to the execution or
performance of a contract”—obviously, corrupt bribes do not qualify. 147 However,
payments made to reimburse foreign officials for expenses directly associated with
visits to product demonstrations, or tours of company facilities do qualify. 148
Notably, while no court has interpreted this defense, 149 the DOJ does facilitate an
FCPA review procedure that provides companies an advance ruling from the DOJ
as to whether or not a proposed activity would provoke FCPA enforcement. 150 In
addition, business practitioners can review published DOJ opinions requested by
other firms with questions regarding particular transactions. 151 Many of these
relate to “the acceptability of payments made for traveling and entertainment
expenses connected to business,” which is one of the main areas of recent concern
for business practitioners. 152

145

Low, supra note 86, at 77.
Taylor, supra note 21, at 7.
147
Id.
148
Low, supra note 86, at 77.
149
Baker, supra note 15, at 663.
150
Commercial Bribery, supra note 59, at 28 (noting that a favorable response from the DOJ sets
up a presumption in favor of the legality of the company’s conduct).
151
DOJ Opinion Releases are available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/.
Business practitioners should note that each DOJ opinion issued has no binding application on any party
which did not join in the specific request, and contains boilerplate language to that effect. However, the
successful requests will offer business practitioners some idea of whether they can justify certain types
of expenditures, and how to go about doing so.
152
Taylor, supra note 21, at 7.
[The] major FCPA settlement in 2007 against Lucent Technologies may make
more companies concerned about the extent of the payments that qualify as
reasonable business expenses. A reading of the 2008 Opinion Releases on the
topic suggests that the DOJ recognizes that transportation costs, meals and
lodging for business-connected visits or trips by government officials or
employees can be legitimate but that the business purpose needs to be clear and
the expenses need to be proportionate to the activity involved.
Id. Accordingly:
The [DOJ] has upheld the payment of travel expenses by several state
agricultural departments for foreign officials to visit the United States to sample
and test agricultural products and to witness demonstrations for the purpose of
promoting their states’ products. The [DOJ] has also allowed U.S. firms to pay
the expense of foreign officials to visit the U.S. in order to tour facilities used in
the performance of contracts, or to attend training required by a contract.
Brown, supra note 10, at 82. Thus:
[T]he DOJ’s released opinions indicate that expenditures are more likely to be
considered “reasonable and bona fide” (i) when made directly to the service
provider as opposed to the government official, and (ii) where the company
making the payments does not have pending business with the government
agency whose employees’ are receiving the benefits of the expenditures.
Baker, supra note 15, at 663–64.
146
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C. Bribery in Action: Practitioner-Focused Examples
To begin, United States v. Metcalf & Eddy 153 presents business practitioners
with an example of a flagrant FCPA violation. In this case, the company provided
travel advances and hotel upgrades for two separate international trips (one to the
United States and the other to Europe) unrelated to business for the chairman of an
Egyptian municipal sanitation and drainage organization—and his wife and two
children. 154 In return, the company secured the chairman’s influence over the
review of bids for a project funded by the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). 155 Accordingly, the company was charged with violations
of both the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA, and settled. 156
The Metcalf case is not imbued with any particular moral for business practitioners
to note—other than the obvious connotation that bribery is wrong, and potentially
expensive.
United States v. Kay 157 is a closer call. Officers at American Rice, Inc.,
Douglas Murphy and David Kay, allegedly authorized payments to Haitian
customs officials to induce their acceptance of documents understating the quantity
of rice the company shipped by approximately one-third. 158 This would
understandably affect a decrease in both the customs duties and sales taxes owed
by American Rice. 159 Initially, a federal district court dismissed the indictment
saying that these payments were “facilitating” payments not made to “obtain or
retain business;” however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed that
decision, saying that the reduction in taxes and duties lowered the costs associated
with doing business and could, therefore, fall within the scope of the “obtain or
retain business” element of the FCPA bribery offense. 160 This is a very significant
holding because it forces business practitioners to acknowledge that “business”
under the FCPA is more than contracts, but also relates to administrative actions
where payment activity is “intended to produce an effect . . . that would ‘assist in
Stated alternatively, under certain
obtaining or retaining business.’” 161
circumstances otherwise excepted facilitating payments may nonetheless violate
the FCPA!
Finally, Baker Hughes Inc. 162 adds an interesting twist, and demonstrates the
potential consequences for falling short with regard to due diligence. The case
involves payments made by an acquired entity through subsidiaries to agents in
India and Brazil, “without determining to whom the money ultimately would be
153

United States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Case No. CV-99-12566 (D. Mass. 1999).
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. Metcalf & Eddy paid a fine of $400,000, agreed to reimburse costs of the investigation,
agreed to implement an FCPA compliance program including financial and accounting controls, and
acquiesced to conducting periodic reviews of these programs. Id.
157
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 756.
162
In the Matter of Baker Hughes Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 1444 (Sept. 12, 2001).
154
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paid or the specific purpose of the payment,” and thereby inaccurately described in
business records. 163 Notably, the payments were not particularly large: In India, a
subsidiary paid $15,000 to obtain shipping permits; similarly, in Brazil, the
company approved a $10,000 payment to obtain approval for in-country corporate
restructuring. 164 The interesting twist, however, is that Baker Hughes’ FCPA
liability did not center on whether or not the payments made were actual bribes—
they may well have been legitimate “grease” payments. Instead, the FCPA
violation occurred when Baker Hughes failed during the merger process to
perform the due diligence necessary to ensure that the payments were not bribes. 165
Thus, this decision goes a step further than Kay in demonstrating that FCPA
liability can surface even when an organization is engaged in an excepted activity
(e.g., making “facilitating” payments) if that activity is not undertaken in complete
compliance with the obligations promulgated by the FCPA.
V. BACK TO THE FUTURE—THE FCPA AND BUSINESS PRACTITIONERS
A. Salient Points for Business Practitioners
First, business practitioners must recognize that FCPA risk is omnipresent, as
this article has noted several times. 166 More significantly, however, this risk
applies not just to organizations, but to individuals as well. 167 Second, business
practitioners must appreciate that, despite the FCPA’s vintage, “only limited
guidance exists on how to comply with its provisions.” 168 Both the lack of
implementing regulations or DOJ-issued guidelines, 169 and the enforcement
agencies’ aforementioned enterprising aggressiveness, necessitate that business
practitioners proceed with caution. Third, business practitioners should understand
that FCPA considerations inherently imply additional legal risks beyond those
previously discussed. Notably, “[w]hen allegations of corruption arise against a
publicly-traded company . . . the risk of a shareholder derivative suit can
increase.” 170 In addition, “[w]hile individuals cannot bring private actions under
the FCPA, courts have allowed private parties to bring FCPA civil claims under

163

Id. at 13.
Id.
165
Id.
166
Koehler, supra note 8, at 396.
[T]he FCPA does not discriminate against any one industry doing business in any
particular country. The 2009 enforcement year also demonstrates that it is just
not Asian, African, or Middle Eastern markets that present FCPA risks as several
of the [2009 corporate FCPA] enforcement actions concerned conduct “closer to
home” in the Western Hemisphere – a region that is often overlooked in terms of
FCPA compliance. The breadth of 2009 enforcement actions, both in terms of
the companies involved and the countries where the alleged conduct took place,
show that FCPA risk is present in all industries operating in all countries.
Id. at 398.
167
Taylor, supra note 21, at 9.
168
Low, supra note 86, at 77.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 111.
164
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the civil provisions of RICO,” and “[p]rivate parties may also bring violations of
the FCPA to the attention of [the DOJ and SEC].” 171 Finally, competitors may
advance allegations as well. 172 Fourth, business practitioners must learn to spot
FCPA issues and understand the statute’s prohibitions. There are several basic
questions business practitioners can familiarize themselves with as a rough
diagnostic to help identify potential FCPA violations, or at least define concerns in
need of further scrutiny. 173 Fifth, business practitioners must learn to identify
potential bribes. There are essentially six ‘red flags’ that increase the likelihood of
prohibited illicit activity and evidence the need for further investigation:
commissions in excess of the going rate; requests for payments in cash, or to areas
other than those where the underlying contract is being performed; urgings by
foreign government decision makers to utilize the services of a specific agent; use
of more than one agent when the economic rationale for doing so is absent,
inadequate, or illusory; and requests by an agent to increase commissions during
the course of active negotiations. 174 Sixth, business practitioners must implement
comprehensive FCPA compliance programs. The importance of this final
preventative point cannot be overstated! Affirmative preliminary action to this end
will, at best, keep business practitioners from having to deal with the FCPA
enforcement agencies and, at worst, limit the impact of litigation should
enforcement materialize. 175 Therefore, the next section provides business
practitioners with a framework for getting started.

171
Baker, supra note 15, at 664–65; see also Low, supra note 86, at 112 (“Companies also tread on
delicate ground when dismissing or terminating employees or third parties, even when these dismissals
or terminations are based upon a finding or belief that the employee or third party has engaged in
improper conduct. Indeed, in several recent cases employees terminated in connection with or
coincidental to the investigation of corruption issues have brought suit against their former
employers.”).
172
Low, supra note 86, at 112 (indicating that the last few years have seen competitors in both the
oil and telecommunications industries invoke the civil racketeering statute to bring suit alleging
improper competition based on allegations of corruption).
173
Knoten, supra note 127, at 40 (summarizing Michael R. Geroe, Complying with U.S.
Antibribery Law, 31 INT’L LAW 1037 (Winter 1997)). Questions include: 1) Is the actor an issuer or a
domestic concern? 2) Is there a “corrupt” intent in the activity? 3) Is there activity “in furtherance of”
a promise or provision of something of value? 4) Does the promise or payment make use of interstate
commerce? 5) Is the recipient of the payment or promise a foreign official or other covered entity? 6)
Was the payment provided to obtain or retain business? Id.
174
Id. at 41.
175
Taylor, supra note 21, at 6. “Obviously, a company needs to consider whether to develop a
policy defining what a facilitating payment is or having a system for authorizing such payments since it
might have to persuade the DOJ and the courts about whether any questioned payments qualify.” Id.
Given the breadth of the FCPA and its interpretation by the SEC, the DOJ and
the courts, all U.S. companies conducting business internationally must create
and implement compliance programs. By establishing such programs and by
conducting rigorous investigations of potential violations of the Act, corporations
can both signal to the enforcement authorities their intention to comply and
prevent or limit the impact of prosecutions and litigation. These programs should
cover both sets [i.e., accounting and anti-bribery provisions] of FCPA
obligations.
Id. at 7.
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B. Guidelines for Compliance
“The establishment of procedures to ensure compliance with the FCPA, and
the practice of due diligence through self-monitoring and reporting to the board of
directors, should . . . be standard for public companies conducting international
business.” 176 Fortunately, the standard elements of such a compliance program are
widely agreed upon. 177 First, a company implementing a new compliance program
(or updating an existing one) should begin by assessing its risk of FCPA noncompliance. 178 This includes considering the extent of its dealings with foreign
officials, use of agents, existing corporate culture and ethics, current compliance
policies, and array of operations. 179 Efforts toward the establishment of an FCPA
compliance program should also be documented from the very beginning as
well. 180 Second, a company should develop a written code of conduct with clear
standards on FCPA issues, and endeavor to create a “culture of compliance” within
the corporation. 181 The firm should make its FCPA policies and determination to
eliminate corruption clear from the top down. 182 Third, the company should
develop due diligence procedures for retaining foreign agents and making
acquisitions in order to examine relevant parties or potential relationships for “red
flags.” 183 Fourth, the company should provide FCPA-related training for all
internal constituents. 184 Fifth, the company must provide a retaliation-free system
for reporting potential FCPA violations. Sixth, create a disciplinary mechanism
for investigating and punishing those violations. 185 Seventh, the company should
enlist an independent audit program for regular review. 186 Finally, eighth, the
company should begin structuring all transactions with the FCPA in mind. 187 This
hinges on clearly establishing the terms of engagement between the company and
any foreign entity, and can be affected by means of pertinent provisions in all
contracts involving foreign parties. 188

176

Baker, supra note 15, at 674.
Taylor, supra note 21, at 7.
178
Baker, supra note 15, at 674.
179
Id. “Companies should focus proportionally more resources on FCPA compliance in those
countries that rate highly on corruption indices.” Id.
180
Id. “It is essential that all efforts to implement and update compliance programs are carefully
documented: in the event of an investigation, the DOJ and SEC consider the compliance program in
determining whether to indict the corporation or to prosecute the individual employee(s).” Id.
181
Taylor, supra note 21, at 8.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. (including domestic and foreign employees and affiliates); see also Baker, supra note 15, at
675 (noting that a company needs “a specific and unambiguous policy on how it expects its U.S.-based
employees and agents to conduct business in a foreign environment” (quoting William L. Jennings &
Craig A. Gillen, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, NAT’L L.J., C10 (1995)).
185
Taylor, supra note 21, at 8.
186
Id.
187
Baker, supra note 15, at 676.
188
Id.; see also Knoten, supra note 127, at 40 n.12 (exemplifying a typical boilerplate clause to this
effect: “Licensee agrees that neither it nor any of its directors, officers, employees, subcontractors or
agents will make any offer, payment, promise to pay or authorization of the payment of any money,
offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to any official, political
177

426

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. V:II

VI. CONCLUSION
Given the uncontroverted expansion in FCPA reach and enforcement, and
the growing global focus on rooting out corruption, it is more crucial than ever
before for business practitioners to understand the risks posed by the FCPA and act
to mitigate them. This includes understanding how to stay within the statutorily
provided margins and avoid bribery of “foreign officials.” In addition, diligence
demands that business practitioners develop effective FCPA compliance programs,
and implement them effectively. Prioritizing these concerns will minimize the
exposure business practitioners face as individuals, and in their corporate lives. In
addition, when all else fails and FCPA enforcement becomes a reality, such
cognizance will allow business practitioners to respond to any FCPA issues
presented so as to minimize potential detriment.

party, party official or political candidate or any person, knowing that all or a portion of such money or
thing of value will be offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly to any official, political party,
party official or political candidate, for the purpose of retaining business for or with, or directing
business to, Licensee or Licensor. As used in this section, the term ‘official’ refers to any officer or
employee in private or public service and includes any officer or employee of a government, or any
department, agency or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in such an official capacity for or on
behalf of any such government or any department, agency or instrumentality thereof.”).

